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Introduction  
Two percent of the total population of South Africa consists of Muslims
2
 who follow a 
practice which may be referred to as Muslim personal law.  Although section 
15 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
3
 recognises religious freedom 
and makes provision for the future recognition of other personal law systems, 
Muslim personal law is, at this stage, not formally recognised in terms of 
South African law. Since Muslim personal law receives no constitutional 
recognition the question may be asked whether the 1996 Constitution, and in 
particular the Bill of Rights as contained in chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution, is applicable 
to "non-recognised" Muslim personal law. The answer to this question depends to a large 
extent on the meaning of "law" as contained in section 8 and item 2 of schedule 6 of the 
1996 Constitution.
4 
 
In order to analyse the meaning of "law" as contained in the 1996 Constitution, 
it is important to determine how the 1996 Constitution is to be interpreted. Section 39 
provides important guidelines and lays down that the "values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom" must be promoted.
5 
Furthermore, international law must and foreign law may be considered6 and, 
finally, the "spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights" must be promoted.7  
 
 
 
 
1  The financial assistance of the NRF (previously the HSRC) is hereby acknowledged with  
 gratitude. 
2  Central Statistical Services Report 03/01/22(91) Population Census 1991. 
3  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996. Hereinafter referred to as the 1996 Constitution. 
4.  See § 2. 
5  Section 39(1)(a) 
6  Sections 39(1)(b) and (c) 
7  Section 39(2) 
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In this note the meaning of "law" as contained in the 1996 Constitution will be compared 
with the meaning of "law" as contained in the Constitution of India, which came into 
operation on 26 January 1950.
8  Such comparison will be done with due 
consideration of the warning expressed in Park-Ross v Director, Office for Serious 
Economic Offences,
9 namely that any comparison with foreign case law  
… should be done with circumspection because of the different contexts within 
which other constitutions were drafted, the different social structures and milieu 
existing in those countries as compared with those in this country, and the 
different historical backgrounds against which the various constitutions came into 
being.
10 
 
2.  The meaning of "law" in the South African constitutions  
2.1  The meaning of "law" and the 1993 Constitution  
The commencement of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
11 on 27 April 1994 
marks the beginning of a new constitutional dispensation for South Africa. 
Section 7(2) of the 1993 Constitution made provision for the application of a Bill of 
Rights to "all law in force".  The constitutional court in Du Plessis v De Klerk
12 held that the 
phrase "all law in force" referred to the common law and statute law. Since 
Muslim personal law is not recognised in terms of South African common law 
or statute law, it may be argued that Muslim law is not "all law in force", and 
that it was, therefore, not subject to the provisions of the Bill of Rights as 
contained in the 1993 Constitution.  It must be kept in mind, however, that Du Plessis v 
De Klerk did not deal with the application of the Bill of Rights on other personal law 
systems, such as Muslim personal law.  
2.2 The meaning of "law" and the 1996 Constitution  
 
 
8 The Constitution of India is unnumbered.  
9 1995 1 SACR 530 (C).  
10 542d-e.  
11  200 of 1993.  Hereinafter referred to as the 1993 Constitution.  
12  1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC) 682.  
 
 
The 1993 Constitution was repealed by the 1996 Constitution that 
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commenced on 4 February 1997.  The phrase "law in force" as contained in 
section 7(2) of the 1993 Constitution was omitted in the 1996 Constitution. 
Section 8(1) of the 1996 Constitution refers only to "all law" and reads:  
The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.13  
The first question that comes to mind is whether the omission of the phrase 
"in force" changes the applicability of the Bill of Rights to non-recognised 
Muslim personal law.  On the face of it, the answer appears to be in the 
negative.  Writers such as Burns
14 
and De Waal, Currie and Erasmus15 argue 
that the Bill of Rights applies to legislation, common law and customary law.16 
If such a viewpoint is to be followed, Muslim personal law is excluded from 
the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights.  The same argument applies to the meaning 
of "law" as contained in item 2(1) of schedule 6, which reads:  
All law that was in force when the new Constitution took effect, continues  
in force, subject to -  
(a) any amendment or repeal;  and  
(b) consistency with the new Constitution.  
 
I do not agree with these viewpoints.  It is inconceivable that there might be certain areas of 
"law" that are not subject to the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights.  Such a viewpoint makes a 
mockery of the supremacy of the Constitution as emphasised in section 2 of the 1996 
Constitution.  Section 2 lays down that "any law or conduct" that is inconsistent with the 
1996 Constitution is invalid and any obligations imposed by the Constitution must be 
performed.  I submit that non-recognised Muslim personal law is indeed included in "all law" 
as contained in section 8(1) of the 1996 Constitution.  
13  Own emphasis.  
14  Burns Administrative Law  
15  De Waal Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 50.  
16  See also Rautenbach and Malherbe Staatsreg 306.  
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Such inference is supported, inter alia, by the text of the 1996 Constitution. Firstly, the use 
of "all law" in the 1996 Constitution in contrast to the use of "all law in force"
17 in the 1993 
Constitution, indicates that the constitutional drafters (perhaps?) envisaged that there could 
be law in South Africa that can not be classified as "law in force", but which nevertheless 
needed to be scrutinised in terms of the Bill of Rights. Muslim personal law would be a law 
system that is not in force, because it is not recognised in terms of South African law, but 
which needs to be scrutinised in terms of the Bill of Rights.   
Secondly, section 2 of the 1996 Constitution recognises the supremacy of the 1996 
Constitution and invalidates "law or conduct" that is inconsistent with the Constitution.  It 
may, therefore, be argued that non-recognised Muslim personal law is "conduct" that is 
subject to the Constitution. The Bill of Rights forms part of the Constitution as a whole and 
therefore it can be argued that the Bill of Rights will also be applicable to conduct that is not 
law in terms of section 8.  
Thirdly, section 15 of the 1996 Constitution refers to "systems" of "religious, personal or 
family law".
18 
The use of the word "law" is a clear indication that the constitution 
writers saw these systems as systems of "law" and, therefore, it may be 
argued that "all law" in section 8(1) of the 1996 Constitution also refers to these 
law systems as "all law" that is subject to the Bill of Rights.  
Fourthly, sections 30 and 31 of the 1996 Constitution, which recognise the religious and 
cultural diversity of the South African population, emphasise that religious and cultural 
rights must be exercised in a manner that is not inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of 
Rights.  It does not make sense to say that Muslims have the right to enjoy their religion 
(which includes the Shari'`a), but that the enjoyment of such a right that may lead to 
inequality before the law is not subject to the Bill of Rights because it is not included in the 
phrase "all law".  
17  Own emphasis.  
18  Own emphasis.  
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A further argument that may be advanced for the inclusion of Muslim personal law in the 
phrase "all law" can be found in the viewpoint of Van der Vyver
19
 regarding the meaning 
of "law".  He argues that "law" consists of both positive state law ("staatlike 
positiewe reg" as he calls it) and positive non-state law ("nie-staatlike 
positiewe reg" as he calls it). Positive state law includes legislation, custom 
and case law. On the other hand, positive non-state law includes, for 
example, the rules of a sports club or an organisation, or the rules of a family 
head laid down for the members of the family.20 If his argument were to be 
followed, it would mean that the rules of a religious group, such as Muslims, 
are positive non-state law that is "law" in terms of South African law.  
Furthermore, numerous Acts in South Africa recognise certain aspects of Muslim 
marriages. For example, section 21(3) of the Insolvency Act
21
 describes the word 
"spouse" to include also a wife or husband married "according to any law or 
custom". In terms of section 31 of the Special Pensions Act
22 
a "dependant" 
includes the spouse of a deceased to whom he or she was married "under 
any Asian religion".  A similar provision appears in the Demobilisation Act.
23 
In 
terms of section 1 of the said Act a "dependant" includes any surviving 
spouse to whom the deceased was married "in accordance with the tenets of 
a religion".  Section 1(2)(a) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act24 includes in 
the term "marriage" all marriages concluded according to the "tenets of any 
religion".  Although it may be argued that this legislation recognises Muslim 
marriages for practical reasons, it is indicative of the plurality of the South 
African society.  It is therefore difficult to motivate why Muslim marriages are 
recognised for certain purposes, but not when the parties of a Muslim 
marriage turn to the courts for the recognition of their union.
25 
 
In spite of these arguments in favour of the inclusion of non-recognised 
Muslim personal law in the phrase "all law", it is not certain whether the 
courts would agree  
 
19  Van Zyl and Van der Vyver Inleiding tot die Regswetenskap ch 7-9.  
20  Van Zyl and Van der Vyver Inleiding tot die Regswetenskap 273.  
21  24 of 1936.  
22  69 of 1996.  
23  99 of 1996.  
24  51 of 1992.  
25  See also Moosa 1995 StellLR 417-424.  
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with this viewpoint.  It is, therefore, recommended that recognition must be given to Muslim 
personal law, or at least to recognise Muslim marriages as valid marriages in South Africa.  
Although the recognition of Muslim personal law or Muslim marriages falls outside the 
scope of this note it would be noteworthy to refer to two recent decisions regarding the 
validity of Muslim marriages.  In Ryland v Edros
26
 the court was prepared to develop 
the common law to give recognition to the contractual consequences of a 
Muslim marriage in order to protect a Muslim wife who was divorced by her 
Muslim husband.  Although this case is seen as a landmark regarding the 
rights of Muslims in South Africa, it is limited in three ways.  Firstly, no 
recognition has been given to Muslim marriages.  It is only the marriage 
contract, which arises from a Muslim marriage, that is recognised as valid.  
Secondly, the court did not deal with polygamous Muslim marriages and it is 
uncertain whether the court would have followed the same route if the 
marriage was in fact polygamous.  Thirdly, it was a decision of the Cape 
Provincial Division and the possibility exists that other provinces might follow 
a different route because of the rule of stare decisis.  
This was indeed what happened in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund
27 
where the court refused to develop the common law in order to afford a claim 
for loss of support to a Muslim widow whose Muslim husband was killed in a 
accident.28 Fortunately this decision of the Durban High Court was recently 
reversed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accident Fund.
29
 The Appeal Court developed the common law regarding a 
dependant's  
 
 
26  1997 1 BCLR 77 (C).  
27  1997 12 BCLR 1716 (D).  
28  An Aquilian action for loss of support is at the disposal of a dependant of a breadwinner who was killed or 
injured as a result of the wrongful actions of another.  This is referred to as the "action of a dependant".  
One of the requirements of the action for loss of support is that the breadwinner must have been under a 
common law duty to support his or her dependants.  The courts have held, up to now, that such a "duty" 
arises from a relationship either from blood or a valid marriage. See Neethling Potgieter and Visser Law of 
Delict 283 et seq. Since a Muslim marriage is not regarded as a valid marriage in terms of South African 
law, the wife of a Muslim is not regarded as a dependant, and therefore, she may not institute a claim for 
loss of support if her husband is killed or injured. See Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 
1997 12 BCLR 1716 (D).  
29  Case no 444/98 of 29.11.99.  Published at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/sca/scadate.html  
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action, without any reliance on the 1993 or 1996 Constitution, to afford a Muslim widow a 
claim for loss of support.  The court held:  
For the purposes of the dependant's action the decisive issue is not whether the 
dependant concerned was or was not lawfully married to the deceased, but 
whether or not the deceased was under a legal duty to support the dependant in a 
relationship which deserved recognition and protection at common law. … On the 
analysis I have previously made she would indeed have such a right even if she 
was not validly married to the deceased in the civil law if the deceased was under 
a legally enforceable contractual duty to support her following upon a de facto 
monogamous marriage in accordance with a recognised and accepted faith such 
as Islam.
30 
 
Once again the effect of this case regarding the recognition of Muslim 
marriages is restricted to the following:  it does not recognise the validity of 
Muslim marriages in general in South Africa, and it does not touch upon the 
action for support of a Muslim widow engaged in a polygamous Muslim 
marriage.
31 
 
3  The meaning of "law" in the Constitution of India  
3.1   Why the Constitution of India?  
There are various reasons why the provisions of the Constitution of India might be of value 
when interpreting provisions of the South African Constitution. Both countries were British 
colonies that received independence from Britain in the twentieth century.
32 
The English 
influence on various areas of the South African and Indian legal systems, 
such as the court system and criminal procedure, are still visible today. Other 
similarities between South Africa and India are their diverse multi-cultural and 
multi-religious societies. Furthermore, a large number of people in South 
Africa and  
 
 
30  27-30.  
31  For a further discussion of the argument in favour of the recognition of Muslim marriages in South Africa 
see Rautenbach "Recognition of Muslim marriages" 21 et seq.  
32  For brief reference to the history of South Africa, see inter alia Boulle, Harris and Hoexter Constitutional 
and Administrative Law 117 et seq.  
33  In South Africa the law of traditional communities are referred to as customary law.  
34 De Reede 1996 Tilburg Foreign Law Review 145.  
35 Moosa Muslim Personal Law 35 et seq.  
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India live according to usage and custom.33 In India the various religious 
communities live according to their own personal law, such as Hindu law, 
Muslim law, Jewish law and so forth.  Both countries have a minority Muslim 
population which lives according to a practice called Muslim personal law. 
Eleven and a half percent of the total population of India consists of 
Muslims.34 The majority of Muslims who first arrived in the former Cape 
Colony were brought from, inter alia, the coastal regions of Southern India as 
slaves, convicts and political exiles.35  
 
Before British rule various personal laws were in force in India.  Muslim 
personal law was applicable to Muslims, Hindu personal law was applicable 
to Hindus, Jewish personal law was applicable to Jews and so forth.  During 
their rule the British followed a policy of non-interference with the personal 
laws of the local population. The result was the co-existence of various 
personal law systems in India. The policy of the government of India today is 
much the same and, although a substantial amount of legislation on some of 
the personal laws has been enacted, the various personal laws in existence 
in India are proof of this policy of the Indian government.36  
 
3.2  The meaning of law in terms of the Constitution of India  
As has been stated separate personal laws were applicable in India before the 
commencement of the Constitution of India.
37 When the Constitution of India is studied, 
two questions arise, namely does the Constitution of India give recognition to the various 
personal laws in India and, if it does, is the Bill of Rights as contained in Part III of the 
Constitution of India applicable to these personal laws?  
 
In contrast to the South African Constitution the Constitution of India does not require any 
special rules of interpretation and it must be interpreted like any other Act in operation in 
India.
38
 The purpose of interpretation is to determine the intention of  
36 Mahmood Statute-Law 10-12; Pearl Interpersonal Conflict of Laws in India 27-34; Diwan Family  
 Law 2-3; The State of Bombay v Narasu Appa AIR 952 Bom 84 87.  
37  Mahmood Personal Laws in a Crisis 14-15; see also § 3.1.  
38  Art 367(1) of the Constitution of India.  
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the legislature.  The purpose of interpreting the Constitution of India is, thus, to determine 
the intention of the constitution writers.
39 
 
In terms of article 372 of the Constitution of India "all the law in force" in India shall 
remain in force "until altered or repealed or amended".  The phrase "law in force" has been 
interpreted by some to include the statutory and non-statutory law of India, which includes, 
inter alia, the various personal laws applicable in India.
40 
Mahmood41 refers to various 
High Court decisions that accepted this outlook and argues that article 372 
gives constitutional recognition to the personal laws in India.  
However, in The State of Bombay v Narasu Appa Mali
42 
the High Court held that 
articles 372(1) and (2) do not refer to personal laws. In this case the validity 
of the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act
43 
was challenged. The 
Act prohibited polygamy between Hindus.  The position regarding polygamy 
between Muslims was unaffected.  It was argued that the Act infringed rights 
in terms of articles 14,44 1545 and 2546 of the Constitution of India. The court held that  
… it is clear from the language of Arts. 372(1) and (2) that the expression "laws in 
force" used in this article does not include personal law because Art. 372(2) 
entitles the President to make adaptations and modifications to the law in force by 
way of repeal or amendment, and surely it cannot be contended that it was 
intended by this provision to authorise the President to make alterations or 
adaptations in the personal law of any community.  … [W]e have come to the 
conclusion that personal law is not included in the expression "laws in force."
47 
 
39  Charanjit Lal v Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41 56;  Ali v Sufaira 1988 2 KLT 94 96.  
40  Bakshi Constitution of India 304-305; Basu Constitutional Law of India 440. 
41  Mahmood Personal Laws in a Crisis 10. 
42  AIR 1952 Bom 84.  
43  25 of 1946.  
44  Equality before law.  
45  Discrimination on the ground of religion.  
46  Freedom of religion. 47 89.  
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The viewpoint of the High Court in State of Bombay v Narasu Appa Mali
48
 was criticised 
by various writers.  Bhattacharjee
49
 referred to various supreme court 
decisions, where the phrase "all laws in force" has been used in a very wide 
and comprehensive manner as to include "statutory or non statutory, written 
or unwritten, customary or common, State-made or Judge-made" law.
50
  He 
assumes that the High Court referred to non-statutory personal law and 
argues that  
… the non-statutory laws of the Hindus or the Muslims were obviously laws in the 
sense acceptable to modern Jurisprudence and [he] would like to think that no one 
would or can ever contend that the non-statutory personal laws of the Hindus or 
the Muslims were or are not such laws.
51 
 
However, it is clear from the facts of the case that the court held that personal 
laws (statutory or non-statutory) were not "law in force" in terms of article 
372.  The obvious question one should ask is then:  if article 372 of the 
Constitution of India does not give constitutional recognition to the various personal laws in 
India, what then is the basis for its continuance in India today?  
According to chief judge Chagla in The State of Bombay v Narasu Appa Mali
52 
the 
Constitution of India gives indirect recognition to the relevant personal law systems in India.  
The court argued that article 44 of the Constitution of India recognises by necessary 
implication the existence and continuance of various personal law in India. Article 44 reads:  
The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code 
throughout the territory of India.  
Furthermore, article 246(2) of the Constitution of India empowers the Legislature to make 
laws regarding personal law matters.  Article 246(2) contains the only reference  
48  AIR 1952 Bom 84.  
49  Bhattacharjee Muslim Law and the Constitution 53-57.  
50  See also Seervai Constitutional Law of India 401-403; Mahmood Muslim Personal Law 87.  
51  57.  
52  AIR 1952 Bom 84 87, 89.  
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to personal laws in the text of the Constitution of India.  In terms of this article the 
Parliament and legislatures of any State in India have the power, subject to certain 
limitations, "to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in list III in the 
Seventh Schedule".  Item 5 of list III includes the following matters:  
Marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption, wills, intestacy and 
succession; joint family and partition; all matters in respect of which parties in 
judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement of this 
Constitution subject to their personal law.
53 
 
In a concurrent but separate judgement judge Gajendragadkar
54
 agreed that 
item 5 of list III gives constitutional recognition to personal laws in India.  
Although indirect constitutional recognition has been given to the various personal laws 
relevant in India, the application of the Bill of Rights as contained in Part III of the 
Constitution of India on these personal laws are a different matter.  Part III of the 
Constitution of India contains a chapter on "fundamental rights" (hereinafter referred to as 
the Bill of Rights). Article 13(1), as contained in the Bill of Rights, lays down:  
All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of 
this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, 
shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.   
The extent of this article is limited in two ways.  First of all it has no retroactive effect.  The 
result is that all existing laws only become void from the commencement of the Constitution 
of India if they are inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.  If any punishable acts were done 
before the commencement of the Constitution of India in contravention of any existing law, 
which is void in terms of article 13(1), such acts will still be punishable.
55 
 
53  Own emphasis.  
54  State of Bombay v Narasu Appa Mali AIR 1952 Bom 84 90-91.  
55  Keshavan Madhava Menon v State of Bombay AIR 1951 SC 128 130.  
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Secondly, the Bill of Rights is not applicable to the various personal laws in India. This is 
indeed a strange phenomenon, which may largely be contributed to the interpretation of 
"law" in the Constitution of India. The term "law" is defined in terms of article 13(3)(a) to 
include "any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usages 
having in the territory of India the force of law".  The phrase "laws in force" is defined in 
terms of article 13(3)(b) to include "laws passed or made by a Legislature or other 
competent authority".  The question, which has been described as a difficult one in 
Srinivasa Aiyar v Saraswathi Ammal,
56 is whether personal laws are included in the 
term "law" and phrase "all laws in force". The court did not, however, think it 
necessary to decide the question.  
The question was answered in the negative in State of Bombay v Narasu Appa Mali.
57 
The 
court rejected an argument that personal law is nothing more than custom 
and usage as defined in terms of article 13(3)(a) and held that   
Custom or usage is deviation from personal law and not personal law itself  
… the difference between personal law and custom is clear and  
unambiguous.   
The court referred to section 112 of the Government of India Act of 1915, which refers to 
personal laws or customs having the force of law, and came to the conclusion that the 
words of section 112 clearly indicates that a distinction exists between personal law and 
custom.  The court argued that the constitution writers had the wording of section 112 
before them when they defined "law" in terms of article 13(3)(a), and the mere fact that they 
omitted personal law from the definition of "law" is an indication of the exclusion of 
"personal law from the purview of Art. 13".
58 
 
Furthermore, the court argued that articles 1759 and 25(2)(b)60 of the Constitution 
of India, which deals specifically with certain aspects of Hindu personal law, are a clear  
56  AIR 1952 Mad 193 195-196.  
57  AIR 1952 Bom 84 88. 58 88-89.  
59  Abolition of untouchability.  
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indication that personal laws in general were excluded from the operation of the Bill of 
Rights.  Chief Justice Chagla held:  
Now, if Hindu personal law became void by reason of Art. 13 and by reason of any 
of its provisions contravening any fundamental right, then it was unnecessary 
specifically to provide in Art. 17 and Art. 25(2)(b) for certain aspects of Hindu 
personal law which contavened Arts. 14 [equality before law] and 15 
[discrimination on the ground of religion].  This clearly shows that only in certain 
respects has the Constitution dealt with personal law.
61 
 
Judge Gajendragadkar62 agreed that personal law is not "law" as defined in 
terms of article 13(3)(a).  He based his viewpoint on another premise. 
According to him personal laws do not derive their validity from the fact that 
they have been enacted by means of legislation.  On the contrary, personal 
laws are derived from "foundational sources" such as Muslim law that is 
derived from the Koran. He came to the conclusion that  
… there can be no doubt that … personal laws cannot be said to have been 
passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority and do not fall 
within the purview of the expression "laws in force".  
Another argument advanced by judge Gajendragadkar in favour of the exclusion of 
personal laws from the application of the Bill of Rights is article 44 of the Constitution of 
India. Article 44 compels the State to secure a Uniform Civil Code for all the citizens of 
India.  According to judge Gajendragadkar article 44 is a direct result of the difficulties 
experienced by the various personal laws applicable in India. He is of opinion that the 
constitution writers recognised these difficulties and, therefore, they "refrained from 
interfering with the provisions of the personal laws" and instead they enacted article 44 to 
secure a Uniform Civil Code applicable to all the citizens of India.
63 
 
60  Throwing open of Hindu religious institutions to all Hindus.  
61  89. 62 State of Bombay v Narasu Appa Mali AIR 1952 Bom 84 90-91.  
63  91-92.  
Rautenbach C  PER/PELJ 1999(2)2 
 
64/70 
 
He referred to Item 5 of list III of Schedule 7 that recognises personal laws and said:   
Thus it is competent either to the State or the Union Legislature to legislate on 
topics falling within the purview of the personal law and yet the expression 
'personal law' is not used in article 13, because, in my opinion, the framers of the 
Constitution wanted to leave the personal laws outside the ambit of Part III of the 
Constitution. … they did not wish that the provisions of the personal laws should 
be challenged by reason of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the 
Constitution and so they did not intend to include these personal laws, within the 
definition of the expression 'laws in force'.
64 
 
In Krishna Singh v Mathura Ahir65 the Supreme Court confirmed that the Bill of 
Rights as contained in part III of the Constitution of India "does not touch upon the 
personal laws of the parties".  Since the Supreme Court is the highest court in India, its 
decisions are binding on all other courts lower in hierarchy.
66 
 
Various academic writers criticise the standpoint of the courts.  Ghouse
67
 finds 
it difficult to see why personal laws are excluded from the scope of article 
13(1). He agrees with Seervai
68 
who argues that the term "law" in article 13 
should include personal laws.  
However, due to the religious and cultural diversity of the Indian population, any attempt to 
apply the Constitution of India to the various personal laws is treated with suspicion.  So far 
the various personal laws in India have escaped the scrutiny of the Constitution of India and 
the Bill of Rights as contained therein.   
 
4  Concluding remarks  
64  97.  
65  AIR 1980 SC 707 712.  
66  Jain Judicial system 134-135.  
67  Ghouse Personal laws 57.  
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Muslim marriages and Muslim personal law are not recognised in terms of South African 
common or constitutional law. The 1996 Constitution makes provision for the recognition of 
traditional and religious marriages and traditional and religious personal law systems by 
means of legislation.  However, up to now, no legislation regarding religious marriages has 
been promulgated.  In order to reach legal certainty regarding the application of the 1996 
Constitution, legislative recognition should be given to Muslim personal law in South 
Africa.
69 
 
It must, however, be remembered that any legislation recognising Muslim 
personal law, or at least Muslim marriages, will have to stand the test of 
constitutionality before it will be accepted.70  Furthermore, if the recognition is 
not acceptable to the Muslim community, the result will be mere paper law.    
In contrast to the South African Constitution, the Constitution of India gives indirect 
constitutional recognition to the relevant personal laws in India.  However, due to 
interpretation of articles 372 and 13 of the Constitution of India, personal law is not seen as 
"law" or "laws in force".  The result is the non-application of the Bill of Rights as contained 
in Part III of the Constitution of India on matters dealing with personal laws.  
The Constitution of India regarding personal laws differs from the South African Constitution 
in one important aspect.  It does not contain a provision similar to section 15(3) of the 1996 
Constitution of South Africa.  Section 15(3) makes it clear that recognition of personal law 
systems based on religion "must be consistent with this section and the other provisions of 
the Constitution."   
Although it is tempting to refer to the position in India regarding the recognition of personal 
laws and the interpretation of "law" as contained in the Constitution of India, such 
comparison must be done with caution.  The relevant provisions of the  
68  Seervai Constitutional Law of India 401-403.  
69  An example of such legislation, although regarding customary marriages, is the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (to be put into operation), which recognises polygamous customary marriages 
as valid marriages.  
70  Section 15(3) of the 1996 Constitution.  
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Constitution of India and the interpretation thereof do not serve as a good example of 
constitutional protection of rights within the personal laws sphere.  One should approach 
the Constitution of India with caution when its provisions are compared to those of the 1996 
Constitution of South Africa.  
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